Chronicle of Russia’s war crimes against Ukraine’s environment: Odesa Oblast, October 2023
Bombardment of port infrastructure, grain storage facilities, a ship repair yard and residential buildings in Odesa Oblast. People injured. All this is the chronicle of one of the twenty terrible months of Russia’s terrorist war against Ukraine.
We are collecting facts about the Russian Federation’s crimes against nature in Odesa and Odesa Oblast during the war: environmental pollution resulting from explosions and damage to infrastructure, contamination of air, water and soil with toxic substances, destruction of ecosystems in protected natural areas and conservation areas of international importance, and more. We will update the information daily, so please send any facts you know to: zeleniy.list1@gmal.com
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Energy parasitism in Odesa as a result of corruption among city officials
Today, buying ground-floor residential premises, especially on the city’s central streets, and converting them into offices, shops and so on is common practice in Odesa. The first thing the owners of such premises do is obtain permission from the city authorities to disconnect the heating. City officials hand out these permits quite readily (and most likely not for free). To see this, one need only walk along a central street and note how many new offices and shops have appeared in residential buildings. Yet by handing out such permits, city officials not only violate the law almost routinely, but also increase the threat to citizens’ property, health and lives.
Background
The switch from central to individual heating in apartments began in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The legislation, which was liberal at the time, facilitated this. Thus, in the Rules for Providing Water Supply, Heating and Sewerage Services to the Population, approved by Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 1497 of 30.12.1997, paragraph 9, subparagraph 3, stipulated: “If a consumer refuses to use water supply, heating and sewerage services, they have the right to terminate the agreement and demand disconnection from the relevant networks.”
The adoption of the new Rules for Providing Central Heating, Cold and Hot Water Supply and Sewerage Services, approved by Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 630 of 21.07.2005 and, on the basis of paragraph 25 of those Rules, the Procedure for Disconnecting Individual Premises in Residential Buildings from Central Heating and Hot Water Supply Networks When Consumers Decline District Heating, approved by Order No. 4 of the Ministry of Construction, Architecture, Housing and Communal Services of Ukraine of 22.11.2005 changed nothing fundamentally for those who wanted to give up central heating.
But in 2007, the state came to its senses and prohibited the disconnection of individual apartments, since this unbalanced the central heating system. Only entire apartment buildings were permitted to disconnect. Amendments were made both to Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 630 and to Order No. 4 of the Ministry of Construction, Architecture, Housing and Communal Services of Ukraine.
Some people even took the matter to the Kyiv District Administrative Court. But the court dismissed the claim.
The court’s reasoning is very telling. Let us quote some of its arguments:
– “When a building is designed, the means of heat supply — district heating — is also incorporated. In accordance with the relevant building regulations governing the installation of heating systems, all risers and internal distribution networks are hydraulically balanced at the design stage to ensure stable operation of the building’s heating system.”
– “Disconnecting individual apartments along a riser unbalances the hydraulic operating conditions of the building’s internal heating system and redistributes the heat-transfer fluid, reducing its supply to other risers. In other words, if the building itself contains 100% of the heat, each apartment receives a certain amount of heat, a certain percentage. If one apartment is disconnected from this integrated, interacting system, the occupants of the other apartments will no longer receive 100% of the heat from the building. The main quantity of heat comes precisely from the entire building, from its integral parts — the apartments — and this produces a return transfer to all the apartments in the building.
Moreover, during construction, specific types of pipes are used for the central heating system, whose physical characteristics are set out in the aforementioned SNiP 2.04.05-91*. The pipes must withstand resistance tests under a specified internal pressure. Table 2 of Appendix 25 to SNiP 2.04.05-91*. Any changes in pressure may lead to unforeseen consequences.”
The rules in force today
The disconnection of apartments from central heating systems in apartment buildings received fresh impetus with the adoption of the new Law “On Housing and Communal Services”. To implement the provisions of the Law, the Procedure for Disconnecting Consumers from Central Heating (Heat Supply) and Hot Water Supply Networks (Systems)was adopted and approved by Order No. 169 of the Ministry of Regional Development, Construction, Housing and Communal Services of Ukraine of 26.07.2019. This procedure established rules for disconnecting buildings from central heating systems and also granted the right to disconnect apartments and non-residential premises in apartment buildings from central heating, but on one condition: on the date the Law of Ukraine “On Housing and Communal Services” entered into force, at least half of the apartments and non-residential premises in the building had already been separated (disconnected) from central heating and the building was included in the list of such buildings. The procedure also required commissions established by local self-government bodies to consider the disconnection of consumers from central heating networks to publish their decisions on the council’s official website.
The reality in Odesa
The first thing anyone seeking to investigate the situation in this area encounters is a complete lack of publicly available information on disconnecting premises in apartment buildings from central heating systems.
The website of the municipal enterprise TMO should contain a list of apartment buildings in which at least half of the apartments and non-residential premises have been separated (disconnected) from central heating. It was there, but then, for unknown reasons, the link to the list became “broken” (meaning it could not be opened). Information requests, followed by an application for pre-trial settlement of the dispute, resulted in the link working again. Now everyone can consult the list of apartment buildings in which, on the date the Law of Ukraine “On Housing and Communal Services” entered into force, at least half of the apartments and non-residential premises had been separated (disconnected) from central heating networks. The list contains a total of 189 buildings, most of them concentrated in the city’s Prymorskyi district.
Despite the legal requirement to publish the minutes of commission meetings having been in force for more than 4 years, this information is still absent from the public domain. A request to the city council elicited very interesting responses from each of the city’s district administrations, stating that the current regulations governing district commissions at the district administrations do not provide for publication of their decisions. In other words, despite the legal requirements, city officials are in no hurry to comply with the law.
Despite all the bureaucratic obstacles and city officials’ unwillingness to provide any information, after filing an application for pre-trial settlement of the dispute, the Zelenyi Lyst civic organisation did manage to obtain the minutes of 2 meetings of the commission at the Prymorskyi District Administration held in late 2021.
An analysis of those minutes showed exactly why local officials are in no hurry to comply with the legislation in force and publish information as the law requires. Their work in this area is largely directed towards violating the requirements established by law. Judge for yourselves.
Regarding minutes No. 5 of 10.09.2021: of the 53 building addresses considered at the commission meeting, only 10 are on the list of buildings where heating can be disconnected in individual premises. There was a refusal for one more address. But permission was granted for the other 42 building addresses, where the law does not allow premises to be disconnected from heating. Sometimes additional conditions are imposed: permission subject to re-registering the account, providing title documents, concluding a contract or paying off debts to TMO.
Regarding minutes No. 7 of 05.11.2021: of the 24 building addresses considered at the commission meeting, only 4 are on the list of buildings where heating can be disconnected in individual premises. No positive decision was taken for two more building addresses. Permission was granted for the other 18 addresses, which are not included in the list of buildings where heating may be disconnected in individual premises; 6 of these permissions had additional conditions.
In our opinion, this state of affairs concerning the granting of unlawful permits to disconnect premises in Odesa’s apartment buildings from heating is due precisely to corruption. Yet few people pay attention to two further consequences of disconnecting individual premises from central heating systems.
One consequence of installing individual heating that experts draw attention to is the phenomenon of energy parasitism. “Those who spread the word about how wonderful it is to have individual heating usually live inside the building (the heated envelope),” notes Oleksandr Hut. “That means they are surrounded on both sides, above and below by heated premises with a temperature of at least 20 degrees, rather than the sub-zero temperature outside. So their apartment will always be at least +18 degrees. If they install a heating boiler, their own heat generator, and supposedly disconnect from the central heating system, it turns out that they are actually deceiving everyone. Essentially, these people are simply stealing heat from neighbours who pay for central heating.”
The second consequence is a reduction in TMO’s customer base, to which the company supplies heat during the cold season. But these actions and these questions do not concern the company or its head, Hanna Ivanivna Pozdniakova. The city authorities are always ready to provide subsidies from Odesa’s budget to cover losses. And it does not matter that some of those losses are caused by the actions of the city authorities themselves. The income goes into officials’ own pockets, while the expenditure is covered at the expense of every Odesa resident.
An attempt to find out from TMO how many customers had been disconnected from central heating systems in recent years, however, met with the enterprise’s employees’ unwillingness to provide this information. To justify withholding it, TMO’s management classified the numerical figures as confidential information and, among other things, independently assigned itself the status of a state authority or local self-government body.
To sum up the above, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1. Odesa officials grant permits to disconnect premises from central heating at their own discretion, disregarding the requirements of the law, which shows signs of corruption.
2. Such permits allow recipients to disconnect their premises in apartment buildings from the central heating system.
3. Such disconnections worsen heating conditions for other residents of buildings in which premises have been separated from central heating systems.
4. TMO’s losses from these unlawful disconnections are compensated by all Odesa residents through the city budget.
To clarify the situation concerning permits to disconnect individual premises in apartment buildings from central heating systems, the Zelenyi Lyst civic organisation approached Odesa City Council member O. Kvasnitska. We hope that more thorough conclusions can be drawn in the future.
Where Russian Transnistria makes money, Ukraine faces environmental problems and Moldova faces energy blackmail
Thermal power stations often become sources of environmental pollution. Among the factors in combined heat and power plants’ operation that critically affect the environment, scientists identify low-grade fuel, outdated production technologies and a lack of appropriate environmental protection systems.
The Moldavskaya GRES thermal power station operates in the part of Moldova occupied by Russia since 1992, in the so-called Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.
Its impacts were investigated by journalists from the civic organisation “Zelenyi Lyst” together with their Moldovan colleagues from TV8.
Environmental problems
The station was built in 1964. Its capacity is 2520 megawatts, and its available capacity is 1700 megawatts. Moldavskaya GRES (MGRES) can run on coal, natural gas and fuel oil. Its outdated equipment means the station causes significant environmental damage.
According to Moldova’s Ministry of Environment, MGRES emitted approximately 3 thousand kilotonnes of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere between 2015 and 2021. By comparison, the largest combined heat and power plant in the territory controlled by Moldova emitted six times less carbon dioxide into the atmosphere over the same period.
MGRES also poses significant environmental and technological threats to Ukraine. These include the threat of flooding Ukrainian villages because of its cooling reservoir and the undisposed-of waste resulting from the operation of the Transnistrian thermal power station.
Svitlana Slesarenok has been working on this region’s problems since the early 2000s. She notes that the Kuchurhan Reservoir was built exclusively for the needs of Moldavskaya GRES.
The reservoir is artificially maintained at a level of up to 3.5 metres for water intake and cooling of the thermal power station. The station uses water from the Dniester, Turunchuk and Kuchurhan rivers. The Ukrainian villages of Kuchurhan and Lymanske lie below the reservoir’s water level. This is a continuous process: without replenishment of the reservoir, MGRES cooling would stop, posing the risk of a technological disaster. At the same time, if the pumping station fails to operate to regulate the reservoir’s water level, the villages around the Kuchurhan Reservoir remain at risk of flooding.
There is a flooding risk for 380 households in Kuchurhan, approximately a third of the total, and more than 100 households in Lymanske.
“Environmental problems, technological problems, problems of financial provision, problems of illness among the population. This reservoir was created for the economic activities of Moldavskaya GRES. To prevent the threat of flooding, a system of protective structures was built. That was in 1967,” explains Larysa Husak, deputy head of the settlement of Lymanske (Ukraine).
MGRES refuses to maintain the drainage system
As Svitlana Slesarenok, head of the civic organisation “Black Sea Women’s Club” (Ukraine), explains, MGRES representatives now refuse to maintain the drainage system, so the entire financial burden falls on local communities:
“Until 1999, Moldavskaya GRES itself maintained it and supplied electricity free of charge, and the pumps pumped water and protected the population from flooding. Then, in 1999, the station stopped doing this. To sustain the technological process of the Moldavskaya power station itself, local communities spend money pumping out water so they do not drown. Today this whole system is in an emergency state. And it is unclear what environmental consequences this could lead to.”
The entire financial burden for Moldavskaya GRES’s pumping and drainage system rests on the community budget in Ukraine. Besides routine repairs, regular maintenance and employees’ wages, the community is forced to spend money on electricity to operate it. Since 2004, 6.8 million hryvnias has already been spent for these purposes from the community’s local budget alone. At today’s rate, that is more than 170 thousand euros, but in reality the amount is much larger, considering exchange-rate changes over the past 20 years.
“As a community, we gain absolutely nothing from the Transnistrian republic conducting economic activity and producing electricity. We only cover our losses,” says Larysa Husak.
MGRES makes money
Throughout the period when Ukrainian communities bore the costs of supporting the Transnistrian power station’s operation, the Russian company MGRES, registered in Chișinău, exported electricity to the European Union.
According to the Customs Service of the Republic of Moldova, MGRES sold electricity on the EU market from 2007 to 2013. The Customs Service of the Republic of Moldova refused to disclose the value of the exports, citing confidentiality.
“The pumps run for an average of 8 to 12 hours, depending on how full the channels are and on the weather. One pump removes 2600 cubic metres an hour. In terms of electricity consumption, one electric motor is rated at 55 kilowatts. You can imagine how much electricity that consumes over 12 hours of operation. So it was very difficult for us as a village council. A third of our budget went on maintaining the pumping station,” explains Anatolii Levytskyi, village elder of Kuchurhan (Ukraine).
Anatolii Levytskyi says the pumps were last repaired in 2016 and 2019 respectively. Their service life after repair is 5–7 years. The pumps, of which there are four in total, could therefore fail soon. There is another difficulty: they are Russian-made, they are simply not available in Ukraine now, and it is still unclear what could replace them and, most importantly, how much that would cost:
“Moldavskaya GRES is categorically opposed to participating in repairs or providing technical assistance. They refuse completely and sign no reports. Commissions concerning Moldavskaya GRES have met here repeatedly. There were representatives of Moldova, representatives of Transnistria and representatives of Ukraine. But they, the Transnistrian representatives, signed none of the reports. We maintain them, we do the pumping for them, we sustain Moldavskaya GRES’s technological cycle with our own money, while they make money from it.”
MGRES declined to comment
Journalists asked the MGRES administration to comment on the environmental problems in Kuchurhan and Lymanske. Although the company’s press service received the request.
At first, the press service answered the reporter’s call and acknowledged receiving the request. But then it stopped responding.
Running on coal
According to Kuchurhan’s village elder, until 2020 MGRES ran on one of the dirtiest fuels: coal.
Notably, the station received coal from the Russian Federation, and possibly also from the occupied Donbas, through Ukrainian territory, even though Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was already under way at the time. According to Moldova’s Customs Service, MGRES imported coal into Transnistria from January 2020 to October 2022.
“When there was a strong wind blowing from that direction, there was a little soot and smoke. It was just, you know, as if you could taste that smoke and soot in the air,” says Anatolii Levytskyi.
Those responsible for monitoring carbon dioxide in the atmosphere calculate MGRES’s emissions according to the fuel used and its quality.
“Every megawatt-hour generated using natural gas releases 0.202 megatonnes of carbon dioxide. We use this ratio to calculate carbon dioxide emissions at the power station concerned. If they run on coal, the coal quota is taken into account. Coal has a different emission factor. So we calculate how much gas and how much coal was used and find the amount of carbon dioxide emissions. It is worth noting that the power station’s efficiency is below 30%. That is, if there are 10 kilowatt-hours in a cubic metre of gas, we consume less than 3 kilowatt-hours and release seven into the air. This efficiency corresponds to the station,” explains Mihai Tîrșu, director of Moldova’s Energy Institute.
Oversight is needed, but the separatists refuse
According to Ion Bulmaga, head of the Republic of Moldova’s Inspectorate for Environmental Protection, inspections are necessary to establish all the environmental problems. For political reasons, however, the Inspectorate’s staff have no access to the territory.
“We have discussed this subject. But this problem has to be resolved at a much higher level. This is a matter for the 5+2 negotiation format, which would allow us to obtain access and form joint inspection teams. But because of the events taking place on our border, this format is known to be no longer viable. As a result, we cannot conduct inspections or state our position in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Moldova,” stresses Ion Bulmaga, head of the Republic of Moldova’s Inspectorate for Environmental Protection.
Ion Bulmaga noted that Tiraspol has a peculiar approach to compliance with environmental standards. If the unrecognised regime in Tiraspol needs permits for certain enterprises to export to the European Union, it allows inspections. If they do not need to export to the EU market, but only to Moldova, they deny the Inspectorate’s staff access to carry out inspections.
Refusing to clean the Kuchurhan Reservoir
For the past 20 years, the station’s management has not replaced the water in the reservoir, significantly worsening its quality.
Residents of Kuchurhan recall that crayfish once lived in the water and lilies bloomed. Now algal blooms and fish kills have become regular occurrences. Specialists from Ukraine’s State Environmental Inspectorate confirm these accounts. An inspection of the reservoir in 2017 found that limits for chlorides, sulphates and dry residue had been exceeded.
“When they wash their reactors, there are a lot of alkaline substances. We had a pumping station in Kuchurhan that pumped water from the estuary for irrigation. After irrigation, the soil was white from these salts,” recalls Anatolii Levytskyi.
However, besides the problem with the Kuchurhan Reservoir, Moldavskaya GRES has also created another misfortune for Ukraine. For many years, employees of the Transnistrian thermal power station dumped toxic waste on land near the Ukrainian village of Hradenytsi.
Problems with the slag dump
The slag dump, which is located on Ukrainian territory, covers approximately 130 hectares. The community cannot use this polluted land until measures are taken to dispose of hazardous substances and reclaim the area.
The slag dump is now covered in grass, so hazardous dust no longer accumulates in the air. For a long time, however, the waste dump was a source of constant danger to the lives and health of Hradenytsi residents. When the wind blew from the dump, the air was full of black dust.
As of 2003, doctors were recording an increase in cancer incidence among local residents. After several decades, the problem has still not been resolved. The full-scale war has now complicated everything.
«The problem exists. It has probably existed for 30 years; this problem is there. The residents of our village face a risk of cancer. The slag dump is on our land. There is no access to it now. But the problem caused by the slag exists for the residents of our village,” says Oleksandr Savchuk, village elder of Hradenytsi (Ukraine).
Meanwhile, Svitlana Slesarenok believes the problem must now be addressed through legal means:
“It is a legal entity. If yet another attempt to resolve this problem fails, we need to move into the legal arena. There are documents showing how much local communities have spent over this time.”
Under Russian control
The legal registration of Transnistria’s MGRES in the Republic of Moldova is a delicate issue, because Chișinău does not recognise state enterprises privatised in the so-called PMR after 1991.
In 2005, the Russian giant Inter RAO UES acquired 51% of MGRES shares. The company’s management board is currently chaired by Boris Kovalchuk, the son of a close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
A number of countries have imposed sanctions on Kovalchuk for supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine. They include the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, EU countries and others.
“As for the Kuchurhan combined heat and power plant (MGRES — ed.), contrary to popular belief, the Republic of Moldova has not recognised the privatisation of this enterprise. The status of an economic operator with which you cooperate is one thing; the status of the privatisation of this enterprise, like that of other enterprises, is another. We have not recognised the privatisation of any enterprise in the Transnistrian region that existed in the Soviet period. We therefore make a very clear distinction between enterprises newly established after 1991, mostly small and medium-sized companies, and privatised enterprises that, as I have already said, were unlawfully appropriated after 1991,” says Oleg Serebrian, the Republic of Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration.
MGRES’s future must be decided
Oleh Rubel, a researcher at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, stresses that the environmental problems resulting from MGRES’s operation cannot be considered separately from Transnistria’s political problems. The situation is complicated by the fact that the problems associated with the Moldavskaya power station’s operation are transboundary and affect the interests of several countries: Ukraine, Moldova and the Russian Federation.
By announcing their intention to join the European Union, Ukraine and Moldova have undertaken obligations to resolve environmental issues. Moldavskaya GRES is already so technically outdated that the question of its closure or comprehensive modernisation arises. At present, it is important to establish a monitoring station meeting European requirements in order to obtain accurate, reliable information on the environmental impact of Moldavskaya GRES’s operation.
“The energy system we see today clearly no longer meets modern requirements in terms of technological and technical approaches, nor does it meet any environmental or political requirements for development. I believe a very thorough assessment must be made of the remaining service life of this station. Several options for repurposing it should be proposed,” said Oleh Rubel.
At the same time, according to Mihai Tîrșu, director of Moldova’s Energy Institute, MGRES currently plays a key role in the Republic of Moldova’s energy infrastructure:
“All right, suppose they close the power station. Where will we get electricity? We have found ourselves in a situation where we cannot function without them. Especially since our energy system is very closely connected to Ukraine through Transnistria.”
On the hook
In summer, MGRES generates approximately 90–95% of the electricity the Republic of Moldova needs. In winter, because combined heat and power plants in territory controlled by Chișinău operate, electricity purchases from MGRES fall to 65–70%.
Until autumn 2022, the Moldovan state company Energocom purchased 67% of its required electricity from MGRES. The remaining 30% came from Ukrainian producers, specifically Energoatom and Ukrhydroenergo. Everything changed in October 2022, when Russia began bombing Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.
“Ukraine developed an energy shortage. As a result, the Ukrainian companies informed us that they could not fulfil their commitments. At that point, we began purchasing from Romanian producers, as Moldova’s and Romania’s energy systems had been synchronised,” says Yevhen Bots, head of the supply department at Energocom (Moldova).
The only electricity import line from Romania to the Republic of Moldova runs through MGRES: Isaccea–Vulcănești–Chișinău. On 15 and 23 November 2022, following Russian bombardments of Odesa Oblast, this line failed and Moldova was left in darkness.
“If something happens at MGRES, the line will be disconnected and the Republic of Moldova will be left without electricity — exactly what happened in November when Ukraine’s energy infrastructure was bombed. We had two outages: one partial and one complete,” emphasises Yevhen Bots.
Does Moldova support MGRES?
The Republic of Moldova pays Moldavskaya GRES approximately 20 million dollars a month for the electricity consumed.
“We currently have a contract until the end of September at a price of 66 dollars per megawatt-hour. Each month we agree with MoldGRES on the volumes they will supply, usually between 300,000 and 320,000 megawatt-hours. Multiplying that by a price of 60 euros gives almost 18–20 million euros a month,” notes Yevhen Bots.
MGRES does not pay Moldovagaz for the fuel it consumes. The scheme works as follows: MGRES pays Tiraspoltransgaz-Transnistria for gas, and that company transfers the money to a special account opened at the PMR’s central bank.
The money is then transferred to the budget of the separatist regime in Tiraspol. As of mid-August this year, Tiraspoltransgaz’s debt to Moldovagaz stood at around 10 billion dollars.
The Republic of Moldova participates in a scheme through which Gazprom finances the existence of the pro-Russian separatist region. At the same time, the cost of electricity for Moldova is almost 50% below the market price:
“We purchase electricity from Moldavskaya GRES at around 50% of the prices in the region. So if we turn to producers in Romania, it is at least 90 euros. If we go to the exchange because producers cannot give us the quantity we need, the supply ranges from 100 to 300 euros depending on the regional situation,” says Yevhen Bots.
Plans to end the dependence
To end its energy dependence on Transnistria, Chișinău has begun building a direct Vulcănești–Chișinău line that will take Moldavskaya GRES out of operation. According to the project, construction is due to finish in 2025.
“The 2025 deadline, mid-2025, is realistic, because in recent months we have negotiated very intensively with the contractor to commit both them and ourselves to meeting these deadlines,” explains Ruslan Surugiu, director of the Consolidated Unit for the Implementation and Monitoring of Energy Projects (Moldova).
However, resolving the environmental problems in Ukraine and in the occupied territory of Moldova caused by MGRES’s activities still requires considerable effort.
The material was created with the support of journalismfund europe.
“Hostages of MGRES”: Where Russia’s PMR makes money, Ukraine faces environmental problems and Moldova faces energy blackmail
Thermal power stations often become sources of environmental pollution. The Moldavskaya GRES thermal power station operates in the part of Moldova occupied by Russia since 1992, in the so-called Transnistrian People’s Republic. It is the largest in Europe.
But Ukrainian villages suffer from the operation of the combined heat and power plant in the PMR: Lymanske and Kuchurhan are at risk of flooding, while Hradenytsi suffers from undisposed-of toxic waste. The contaminated land on Ukrainian territory covers around 130 hectares.
Ukrainian communities are also forced to spend budget funds continuously on what is, in essence, supporting MGRES’s technical operating cycle.
Meanwhile, Moldova depends for its energy on the operation of the thermal power station in Transnistria. In effect, it depends on the separatist regime in the PMR, backed by the Kremlin’s leaders. MGRES is owned by a Russian company headed by Boris Kovalchuk, a sanctioned close associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin.
For a time, MGRES even exported electricity to the EU, circumventing sanctions by registering the company in Chișinău.
Thus, while MGRES makes money and replenishes the budget of unrecognised Transnistria, Ukraine faces environmental problems and Moldova is critically dependent on the separatists and their Kremlin henchmen.
The civic organisation “Zelenyi Lyst” together with journalists from Moldova’s TV8 produced an investigative film about MGRES.
The documentary was produced with the support of Journalismfund.
Where Odesa’s budget is spent under the label “for the Armed Forces of Ukraine”
All funds intended to be transferred from the city budget to the Armed Forces of Ukraine pass through budget programme 2219800, whose chief spending unit is the Department of Municipal Security.
But whether all the funds really reach the Armed Forces, as the mayor says, was investigated by the civic organisation “Zelenyi Lyst”.
We obtained a draft decision “On Amendments to the Municipal Targeted Programme ‘Safe City of Odesa’ for 2020–2024, Approved by Odesa City Council on 18 March 2020, No. 5797-VII”. We should say immediately that this is not the final version: according to the figures in the decision amending the budget, the final version has been increased by 21.6 million hryvnias. But this changes nothing fundamentally.
An analysis of this document makes it possible to understand the amount of money that the mayor declares to be “for the Armed Forces of Ukraine” in 2023, but which actually goes first and foremost not to the Armed Forces but to other security and law-enforcement bodies. Here are our findings.
Item 4 of the programme provides expenditure for the Southern Regional Directorate of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in the amount of 31.2 million hryvnias. This includes purchases of vehicles, visual and thermal-imaging surveillance equipment and so on. Most likely, this concerns equipping the border. But these are not funds “for the Armed Forces of Ukraine”.
Item 5 of the programme provides expenditure for the Main Directorate of the National Police in Odesa Oblast in the amount of 5.35 million hryvnias, of which 5 million is for purchasing vehicles and 350 thousand is for ensuring proper accessibility for citizens through routine repairs to premises. These funds are also not “for the Armed Forces of Ukraine”.
Item 6 of the programme provides expenditure for the Patrol Police Directorate in Odesa Oblast of the Patrol Police Department in the amount of 6 million hryvnias. This includes purchasing, equipping, servicing and repairing vehicles, and purchasing computer equipment, uniforms and protective gear for bicycle and motorcycle patrol personnel. Whatever else it may be, this is certainly not money “for the Armed Forces of Ukraine”.
Item 7 of the programme provides expenditure for the Security Service of Ukraine Directorate in Odesa Oblast in the amount of 10 million hryvnias. This includes purchasing and maintaining vehicles, purchasing fuel and lubricants, special-purpose equipment, computers, office equipment, licensed software and related materials. This money, too, is not “for the Armed Forces of Ukraine”.
Item 8 of the programme provides funds for the National Guard of Ukraine in the amount of 53.6 million hryvnias, of which 38.3 million is for carrying out official duties to protect public order and citizens’ safety in Odesa. It is difficult to regard these 38.3 million hryvnias as money going “to the Armed Forces of Ukraine”. This expenditure is especially hard to understand when one recalls that the city has a municipal institution called the “Municipal Guard”, for which expenditure of 107.7 million hryvnias is planned in 2023.
Item 9 of the programme provides funds for the Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centres in the amount of 5.16 million hryvnias, planned to be spent on office equipment and communications devices. Even though the Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centres are formally part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, it is difficult to call such spending “for the Armed Forces”.
Item 14 of the programme provides funds for the Territorial Directorate of the Economic Security Bureau in Odesa Oblast in the amount of 2 million hryvnias. These funds are intended for purchasing and maintaining motor vehicles and office equipment. It is also difficult to classify this money as being “for the Armed Forces of Ukraine”.
Item 18 of the programme provides expenditure for the Regional Service Centre of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Main Service Centre in Odesa Oblast in the amount of 1.64 million hryvnias through the purchase of vehicles. This is certainly not expenditure “for the Armed Forces of Ukraine”.
Item 19 of the programme provides expenditure for the Territorial Directorate of the State Bureau of Investigation in the amount of 5 million hryvnias through routine repairs to an administrative building in Odesa. This, too, is difficult to call money “for the Armed Forces of Ukraine”
Item 20 of the programme provides expenditure to support the activities of the Odesa Scientific Research Forensic Centre of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the amount of 1.9 million hryvnias to build a specialised underground shelter. This is hardly expenditure “for the Armed Forces of Ukraine”.
As we pointed out previously, expenditure under the municipal targeted programme is recorded under 3 codes. Subtracting expenditure under code 8120 of 3.12 million hryvnias and under code 8230 of 16.5 million hryvnias from the programme’s total of 588.2 million hryvnias leaves 568.6 million hryvnias “to fund the Armed Forces of Ukraine”.
To sum up, the following conclusion can be drawn: of the stated 568.6 million hryvnias budgeted for the municipal targeted programme “Safe City of Odesa” for 2020–2024 and supposedly going “to the Armed Forces of Ukraine” in 2023, 106.6 million hryvnias definitely does not go “to the Armed Forces”.
Providing for other security and law-enforcement bodies is indeed important, but it should have a much lower priority than money genuinely going to the Armed Forces during a full-scale war. Moreover, it looks like plain and simple bribery.
Chronicle of Russia’s war crimes against Ukraine’s environment: Odesa Oblast, September 2023
September 2023 was marked by new heavy attacks on Odesa and Odesa Oblast, with people killed and injured. Attacks on Ukraine’s Danube ports continued. Drones and debris increasingly crossed into neighbouring Romania, a NATO country that initially overlooked and denied these facts. By the end of the month, it had moved its air-defence systems to the border.
We are collecting facts about the Russian Federation’s crimes against nature in Odesa and Odesa Oblast during the war: environmental pollution resulting from explosions and damage to infrastructure, contamination of air, water and soil with toxic substances, destruction of ecosystems in protected natural areas and conservation areas of international importance, and more. We will update the information daily, so please send any facts you know to: zeleniy.list1@gmal.com
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What is wrong with recruitment centres? Part 2 — fear of mobile phones
In response to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence’s public appeal, published on its official website, concerning how well recruitment centres perform their functions, the Zelenyi Lyst civic organisation is publishing the second part of the events experienced by its member, Serhii Bondarenko.
The first part, “The Hell of Going Through the Medical Board”, can be read at this link.
What follows is material on the work of the Odesa Regional and Prymorskyi District Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centres and the Military Law Enforcement Service, gathered by Serhii Bondarenko on an editorial assignment.
As it turned out, recruitment centre representatives are afraid of mobile phones. Most likely, they fear that people liable for military service will use their own mobile phones to contact lawyers, access legislation or simply record unlawful actions by recruitment centre staff.
On 4 May this year, I once again had to report, in response to a summons, to Odesa’s Prymorskyi District Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centre (hereafter, the Prymorskyi recruitment centre). At the entrance, I was told that their visiting rules had changed and that I therefore had to hand over my own mobile phone. Otherwise, the checkpoint staff would not be able to let me in, despite my summons.
As a law-abiding citizen, I know that military service is a special form of public service, and that the Constitution of Ukraine requires public officials to act solely on the basis of, within the powers of and in the manner provided for by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine. So I handed over my own mobile phone.
When I got home and searched the subject on Google, I realised that the Prymorskyi recruitment centre employee had been wrong: Ukrainian legislation contains no provisions of the kind he cited. I decided to get to the bottom of the matter, so I prepared a complaint to the Prymorskyi recruitment centre about the checkpoint staff’s actions, and a public information request to the regional recruitment centre concerning the document under which I supposedly had to surrender my own mobile phone at the entrance to a recruitment centre.
Incidentally, I have still received no response to the complaint submitted to the Prymorskyi recruitment centre.
But the regional recruitment centre provided an interesting response.
As we can see, the regional recruitment centre refers to an instruction requiring personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to do something. Naturally, the instruction does not apply to civilians. But the most telling part is the final paragraph, in which the regional recruitment centre explicitly states that it is not the holder of the instruction it itself cited. To understand the inadequacy of this response, one need only open the Law of Ukraine “On Access to Public Information” and verify that information received by an information holder is also public information.
Or, translated from bureaucratese into plain language, the regional recruitment centre told me that there is some instruction requiring something exclusively of military personnel, but that it had not received it — while making full use of it and extending its provisions to civilians as well.
With time available until 1 June, I contacted other military command bodies and eventually obtained a copy of this instruction, which the regional recruitment centre did not have.
On 1 June, I once again went to the Prymorskyi recruitment centre in response to a summons. Serviceman Hychka was sitting at the duty desk and demanded that I hand over my own mobile phone; otherwise, he would not let me into the Prymorskyi recruitment centre, despite the summons. First, I asked Hychka several times to put his demand in writing. Hychka played the stupid, deaf soldier and did not respond at all. Then I asked him several times to invite his commander into the centre’s lobby so that the commander could explain the reason for Hychka’s actions. Again, my requests were completely ignored.
Had I tried to force my way into the Prymorskyi recruitment centre, I would have been entirely in the wrong despite the summons. So, settling down in the lobby, I used the very phone whose use Hychka was so eager to restrict to start looking for what to do and whom to call.
My first call was to the Specialised Defence Prosecutor’s Office of the Southern Region. They explained that they consider only documents received from other bodies and suggested calling the police.
The police accepted the call on 102, but then a police officer called back and explained that it was outside their competence. When I asked what I should do, they advised me to contact the Military Law Enforcement Service.
I called the Military Law Enforcement Service and explained the situation. They told me they could not come to the Prymorskyi recruitment centre themselves at that moment, but suggested I visit them. Especially since they were not far away…
And then complete madness began… Hearing that I intended to go to the Military Law Enforcement Service, Hychka grandiosely demonstrated his power to the civilians in the Prymorskyi recruitment centre’s lobby. To humiliate my honour and dignity, he loudly gave a knowingly criminal oral order to the other servicemen on guard at the centre not to let me leave the premises.
Let us pause to analyse the legislation in force.
1. Both the Internal Service Statute and the Disciplinary Statute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine clearly stipulate that manifestly criminal orders must not be carried out.
2. The Constitution of Ukraine stipulates:
– Everyone is guaranteed freedom of movement (Article 33, paragraph 1);
– Giving and carrying out a manifestly criminal instruction or order entails legal liability (Article 60, paragraph 2)
3. Article 146 of the Criminal Code provides for liability for unlawful deprivation of liberty.
But despite the legal provisions in force, the guards, carrying out a knowingly criminal order, closed the door in front of me, preventing me from reaching the Military Law Enforcement Service.
For reasons I cannot understand, one of the guards, seeing that I was trying to leave the recruitment centre building but was not attacking them in any way, also began threatening me, telling me how they could break my ribs or even kill me. And can one disbelieve a trained, armed man?
Observing these events, serviceman Hychka realised that I had no intention of complying with his knowingly unlawful demands and asked me to wait a couple of minutes. When I stopped trying to leave the building, Hychka disappeared somewhere for 1.5–2 minutes and, on returning, allowed me to enter the recruitment centre with my own mobile phone.
On 2 June, I did visit the Military Law Enforcement Service, where I lodged a complaint about the recruitment centre servicemen’s actions. I attached the regional recruitment centre’s response stating that it had not received the instruction in question.
On 8 June, I once again went to the Prymorskyi recruitment centre in response to a summons. As I passed through the checkpoint, I observed the following: not a single serviceman asked any visitor to hand over a mobile phone.
In the second half of July, I received a response from the Military Law Enforcement Service.
The very first paragraph already distorted the facts, because it was not Hychka who threatened to kill me. There was more to come.
Supposedly, Hychka had asked me to hand over the phone on “lawful grounds”. Yet these “lawful grounds” were not specified in any way.
The Military Law Enforcement Service representatives then confirmed my conflict with Hychka but drew a very interesting conclusion: the fact that my phone remained with me showed that my rights had not been violated. In other words, from the military’s point of view, unlawfully depriving me of my liberty, threatening to kill me and servicemen carrying out a knowingly criminal order are not criminal offences.
Most likely, after the scandal involving Borysov began, some “bright spark” decided that recruitment centre visitors’ right to use their own mobile phones should be restricted. Yet this was not documented in any way. What they feared more — that visitors might record solicitations for bribes or something else — is anyone’s guess.
But after the scandal in which I was involved, this practice was very quickly wound down. Having received my complaint, the Military Law Enforcement Service representatives tried to shield the recruitment centre representatives, attempting to present Hychka’s actions as lawful, unaware that the centre had already stopped requiring visitors to surrender their own mobile phones.
Serhii Bondarenko, specially for Zelenyi Lyst.
On the basis of the material collected, the Zelenyi Lyst civic organisation submitted a corresponding statement to the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine.
We hope the material collected will allow the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine to improve the work of territorial recruitment centres.
Civic activists launch a new movement: “The State for You”
Today, one of Ukraine’s main domestic challenges is building a democratic society.
What is a democratic society? It means preventing human rights violations and eradicating the negative phenomenon of corruption.
To address this problem, a civic initiative has been founded: “The State for You”.
Founders:
1. Nataliia Bilak — PhD in Law, co-founder of the Ukraine Charitable Movement Foundation, managing partner of Svitlo Law Firm, human rights defender and researcher.
2. Tetiana Petrova — head of the Support for Discriminated Groups Charitable Foundation, journalist, civic activist and human rights defender.
3. Valentyna Puzikova — PhD in Law, member of the Council of Advocates of Kharkiv Oblast, lawyer and human rights defender.
The project’s mission is to:
1. Foster people’s legal awareness in accordance with European values, particularly an understanding of their own importance to society;
2. Foster legal awareness among officials and civil servants at every level of government, guided by the principle of “the state for the person”, and an understanding of the importance of every individual in the state, their rights and legitimate interests.
The main objectives of the civic initiative “The State for You” are:
– to set the state mechanism in motion;
– to help protect the rights and freedoms of the state;
– preventive action (preventing human rights violations);
– to help restore violated human rights;
– to help raise legal awareness and legal culture;
– to help eradicate corruption;
– to move closer to the EU.
Areas of activity:
1) advocacy;
2) organising outreach activities and raising awareness among people facing situations that require specialised legal knowledge;
3) human rights work aimed at defending people’s legitimate rights and freedoms.
For any questions, please contact us:
By telephone: +380631939707
By email: stateforyou2023@gmail.com
For the first time in Ukraine, flamingos nest at Tuzlivski Lymany and raise nearly 200 chicks
Despite the war, 570 greater flamingos spent six months, from spring to autumn 2023, living at the Tuzlivski Lymany in Odesa Oblast and raised 192 chicks. Before this year they had only passed through these places on migration. Why did this happen, and why now? And why is it a genuine miracle?
Ivan Rusev, Doctor of Biological Sciences and head of the research department at Tuzlivski Lymany National Nature Park, told the story on his Facebook page.
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