Monthly Archive August 2026

ByVladislav Balinsky

The Danube Is Running Low: Why Europe’s Great River Is Losing Water and What It Means for Ukraine

Water and Climate · Danube · Interview

For southern Ukraine, low water on the Danube is not a distant European anomaly. Ports, municipal water supplies, the Danube lakes and the resilience of the entire region to droughts and floods all depend on the river.

This summer, water levels on the middle Danube fell by about two metres, while discharge on some stretches dropped three- to fourfold. Ruslan Havryliuk explains why heat is only part of the story, how decades of regulation have changed the river, and why the consequences now extend far beyond navigation.

Satellite image of the Danube near Corabia, Romania, during low water
Photo 1. The Danube near Corabia, Romania, 12 August 2024. Effects of low river levels. Sentinel-2 / Copernicus EU satellite image.

Low water on the Danube can easily become a striking story about exposed banks and submerged artefacts. For Europe’s water system, however, the more important question is how much water levels and discharge have changed and what that means for infrastructure, ecosystems and the cities that depend on the river.

The Danube below normal: what the observations show

The Danube has become one of the main stories of recent weeks, although the warning signs were already there: extreme heat spread across Europe at the beginning of summer, including the Danube basin. The problem is not limited to this river. The same pattern is being observed on the Rhine, which flows into the North Sea, where one monitoring station recorded the lowest water level in the entire measurement record dating back to 1880.

No comparable absolute record has yet been officially declared for the Danube, but falling levels and discharge have already had a substantial impact on navigation and energy. This is critical for Hungary and Romania, whose nuclear power plants are located directly on the Danube and depend on its water availability.

People walk across the exposed bed of the Danube in central Budapest
Photo 2. People walk across the exposed bed of the Danube in central Budapest. Photo: Attila Kisbenedek / AFP / East News.
Low water on the Danube in Serbia exposes remains of a Nazi German fleet vessel
Photo 3. In Serbia, low water exposed the remains of a ship from Nazi Germany’s fleet. Photo: Reuters.

Measurements, not impressions

These are confirmed data. All countries in the Danube basin, including Ukraine, exchange hydrological observations through the open DanubeHIS portal, where changes in water level, temperature and discharge can be tracked over recent years.

The analysis shows that on the middle Danube, near Budapest, Belgrade and Novi Sad, the water level fell by about two metres. At the large transboundary Iron Gates reservoir on the Romanian-Serbian border, the level is regulated and changed by only a few centimetres because it is a managed system. Downstream, however, conditions deteriorate again: near Romania’s Cernavodă nuclear power plant, discharge is about 1,500 m³/s — extremely low. After the Siret and Prut rivers, which originate in the Ukrainian Carpathians, enter the Danube, discharge rises to around 2,000 m³/s. In spring it reached 8,000 m³/s, while the normal value is about 6,000 m³/s. That is a three- to fourfold reduction.

Because of this, the Romanian government is resorting to blasting rock and sinking old vessels to redirect the flow into a single channel. In Romania, the river divides into several branches, and one of them contains the Cernavodă nuclear power plant and the head of the Danube–Black Sea Canal. The aim is to raise the water level by just four centimetres, and even that requires enormous effort.

Cernavodă nuclear power plant on the Danube in Romania
Photo 4. The Cernavodă nuclear power plant on the Danube in Romania. Photo: Romania Journal.ro.

The current crisis is layered onto a long history of engineering intervention in the river. To understand why low water so quickly becomes a systemic problem, it is important to look not only at the weather but also at how people have altered the mechanisms by which water is stored and moved through the landscape.

A river reshaped by people for decades

Before dams and reservoirs were built, the Danube was a free-flowing river that carried enormous amounts of sediment into the Black Sea. This is what allowed the unique Danube Delta to form and expand over roughly the past 150 years. Today, it is a protected area on both the Ukrainian and Romanian sides.

Lake Kuhurlui in the Danube Delta
Photo 5. Lake Kuhurlui in the Danube Delta. Photo: Maksym Yakovliev / Rewilding Ukraine.

Historically, the Danube has been a multipurpose artery for the countries of the region. It flows through or along the borders of ten countries, while its entire basin covers 19 states and more than 800,000 km² — an area larger than Ukraine. More than 80 million people live in the basin. For Ukraine, the Danube ports now play a critical role in trade and the economy under conditions of Russian aggression.

The groundwater component is equally important. Riverbank water intakes in the Danube valley, located tens to hundreds of metres from the river, supply drinking water to four European capitals on the Danube. For Vienna, the Danube is a backup source; for Belgrade, Budapest and Bratislava, it is a key source. The same applies in Ukraine: the largest Ukrainian cities on the Danube, Izmail and Reni, use this type of water-supply system, while Vylkove and Kiliia take water directly from the river.

For Ukraine, this discussion is especially practical. The Danube and the Dniester are tied to urban water supplies, port operations, lakes and wetlands in Odesa Oblast. A European hydrological anomaly therefore very quickly becomes a local water-security issue.

The Ukrainian dimension: the Danube, the Dniester and water for cities

The situation on the Dniester is no less critical. A large part of its basin lies in Ukraine; the river then passes through Moldova, which depends on Dniester water for more than half of its needs, before returning to Ukraine. Dniester water is what supplies Odesa’s water supply. When Mykolaiv’s Dnipro-based water supply was destroyed during the occupation of Kherson Oblast, volunteers brought water to the city from the Dniester.

Releases from the Dniester reservoir are currently being reduced on a regular basis, with the joint Ukrainian-Moldovan intergovernmental commission reviewing them almost every week. The headwaters of both the Danube system, through the Prut, Siret and Tysa, and the Dniester lie in the Ukrainian Carpathians, so both basins are experiencing a similar decline in water availability. This is a systemic rather than a local problem.

Infographic comparing average Danube depth with August 2026 values in Reni, Izmail, Kiliia and Vylkove
Photo 6. Comparison of the Danube’s average depth with values recorded in August 2026 in Reni, Izmail, Kiliia and Vylkove. Infographic: Suspilne Odesa.
Falling Danube water levels in Odesa Oblast in August 2026
Photo 7. Falling Danube water levels in Odesa Oblast in August 2026. Photo: Vladyslav Balinskyi.

Heat triggers the crisis but does not fully explain it

The abnormal heat of mid- and late June, when temperatures in Western Europe reached 40°C and above, affected not only the traditionally hot southern countries but also northern France and southern Germany — the Black Forest region where the Danube begins. But this is only one factor in a long-term trend: droughts are becoming more frequent and more severe, and episodes like the current one are recurring ever more often — once roughly a decade in the past, now several times within a decade.

The reason is the declining ability of landscapes to retain water: small rivers disappear, groundwater levels fall, wetlands are lost and mountain forests are cut. A clear example is the Danube lakes, including Yalpuh, Ukraine’s largest freshwater lake. They no longer receive enough inflow from small rivers and now effectively depend on artificial replenishment with Danube water.

Agriculture also plays a role. Crops such as sunflower and maize require large amounts of moisture, so together with its harvest Ukraine is effectively exporting water as well. The government is currently trying to expand irrigation, but this does not solve the shortage and only increases pressure on water resources. The Kakhovka reservoir is another revealing example: agriculture was unprepared for the new conditions of restricted access to water. Large open water bodies also lose significant volumes through evaporation, which intensifies as temperatures rise.

Why rain does not restore the water balance

Rainfall will improve the situation but will not solve the underlying problem. The capacity of soils and the geological environment to retain moisture is declining because of mountain deforestation, the loss of wetlands and falling groundwater levels. As a result, the Danube now depends far more directly on precipitation than on the natural reserve that once maintained a stable minimum flow.

When rain falls, the water runs off rapidly across the surface and disappears just as quickly. The natural “buffer” that once fed the river between rainfall events is no longer there. It is the same process that dries out peatlands in Ukraine’s Polissia, eventually contributing to peat fires and smoke over Kyiv.

Low water stops being solely an environmental issue when infrastructure designed for a different hydrological regime begins to lose its safety margin.

When low water becomes an infrastructure risk

The clearest example is the nuclear power plants in Romania and Hungary, built 40–50 years ago on the assumption that Danube levels would remain stable. Unlike Ukrainian nuclear plants, they do not have cooling ponds: reactor cooling is once-through, directly from the river. Now, as water levels fall, the cooling-water intake pumps become exposed, creating a serious challenge whose consequences are difficult to predict.

Giving rivers back their freedom: what deregulation means

This is probably a matter of decades. Ukraine had long discussed gradually lowering the level of the Kakhovka reservoir, but in the end it happened instantly and catastrophically when Russian forces blew up the dam. About 18 km³ of water was released into the Black Sea in a short period, causing serious damage to the marine ecosystem.

Deregulation should begin with small steps: small rivers and abandoned hydraulic structures that no longer serve any economic function. At the same time, wetlands in river headwaters should be restored. Europe’s beaver population is a revealing example: once reduced to a handful of refuges, it has now recovered across the continent and naturally recreates wetland landscapes, retaining water wherever the animals build dams.

The European Union has officially adopted a course toward restoring free-flowing rivers: the goal is to restore 25,000 kilometres of free-flowing river stretches by 2030, while the EU Nature Restoration Law provides for the recovery of both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems.

On the Danube itself, debate continues around the Iron Gates hydropower complex, the only structure on the river’s main channel comparable to Ukraine’s DniproHES. The dam traps sediment and silt, negatively affecting the lower Danube ecosystem, increasing erosion and reducing biodiversity while also decreasing the reservoir’s useful capacity. Fish passages are also being discussed, because any dam fragments a river ecosystem, as can be seen on the Southern Bug above and below the Oleksandrivka dam, or on the Dnipro, where reservoirs have replaced a river ecosystem with a lake-like one.

Further downstream, the problem is no longer measured only in centimetres of water level. Slower water dilutes pollution less effectively, changes conditions for benthic ecosystems and affects the quality of the water cities receive.

The lower Danube: slower flow, poorer water quality

The ecosystems of the lower Danube suffer most. The fact that water levels in the Ukrainian section have not yet fallen sharply is explained by its proximity to the Black Sea, but that also means seawater is being drawn upstream. A similar process is already clearly visible on the Southern Bug and the Dnipro, where a wedge of saline water is moving farther inland and increasing river salinity. Because the Danube’s discharge is much greater than the Dnipro’s, this has not yet been observed there, but the mechanism is possible in principle.

Lower flow velocity and discharge directly worsen water quality: the slower the current, the less effectively the river cleans itself and the less pollution is diluted. This is supported by studies of bottom sediments in the Iron Gates reservoir, where pollution from upstream has accumulated for decades, as well as by Ukrainian research on microplastics in lower-Danube sediments.

This directly affects water supply as well. Riverbank groundwater intakes in the Danube valley effectively use Danube water naturally filtered through alluvial sands. This is how water supply works in Bratislava, Budapest and Ukrainian Danube cities. Deteriorating water quality in the river therefore threatens the quality of the water these cities receive. As surface-water levels fall in Ukraine’s Danube lakes, water already has to be pumped into them artificially.

Zeleniy Lyst context. We have previously written about surface-water monitoring in the Danube, Dniester and Southern Bug basins and why river-water quality requires continuous laboratory monitoring.

Drought after flood: why this is not a contradiction

The total amount of precipitation in our river basins is not changing as much as its pattern. When intense rain falls, it is more likely to cause flooding because landscapes have lost the ability to store water in lakes, soils and wetlands. Without that capacity, rainfall turns immediately into a flood instead of gradually feeding the river.

The European Union has a separate directive on preparing for floods and high-water events, defining areas at risk and rules for managing them. The main principle is to free not only the river channel but the entire floodplain so that the river can overflow without damaging infrastructure. A telling example of the opposite approach is the Elenite resort, built in a river valley between Varna and Burgas in Bulgaria, which was completely washed away by a flood last year.

The response to low water cannot be reduced to a single large infrastructure project. In the logic described by Ruslan Havryliuk, resilience returns when landscapes regain their ability to retain water — from small rivers and wetlands to the way cities consume water.

What can be changed today

This is a shared responsibility that begins not with waiting for government action but with building public demand from below. There have already been some positive shifts: younger people generally have a stronger awareness of environmental value than earlier generations, and state river-basin management plans provide for specific measures. The main problem is funding: many Ukrainian cities still lack wastewater-treatment facilities and discharge untreated effluent into rivers.

Countries that joined the EU before Ukraine have gone through this process. For example, after joining the European Union in 2006, Romania spent tens of billions of euros implementing the Water Framework Directive and the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive, whose requirements have only become stricter over time.

At the household-consumption level, the situation in Ukraine is gradually improving. In Kyiv, per-capita water use has fallen substantially over the years of independence, largely because of tariff policy, even though Ukrainian water tariffs remain lower than in EU countries. At the same time, southern Ukraine is already being forced to rebuild its water-supply system after the destruction of Dnipro water intakes that supplied Mykolaiv and Kryvyi Rih.

For southern Ukraine, low water on the Danube matters not only as a climate story. The Danube and Dniester are simultaneously natural systems, sources of water supply, transport arteries and the foundation of wetland ecosystems. When a landscape loses its ability to retain water, the same problem appears as drought, destructive flooding and deteriorating water quality.

A few rainy weeks may therefore raise river levels temporarily, but they will not restore the river’s natural reserve of resilience. Europe’s course toward restoring free-flowing rivers and wetlands points to a direction: fewer barriers in rivers, more room for floodplains and a greater capacity for landscapes to store water where it falls.

Sources and previous publication

  1. DanubeHIS — the Danube basin hydrological information system cited in the material.
  2. Ukrainian Radio — the broadcast on which Tetiana Herasymova based the material.
  3. National Ecological Centre of Ukraine — the previously published version of the material.
ByVladislav Balinsky

Grain, Oil or Fuel: What Was Really Burning at the Port of Taman

Environmental Monitoring · Satellite Analysis

Grain, oil or petroleum: what actually burned at the port of Taman. A spatial-dynamic analysis of the strike on the transport-and-fuel node of the Kerch Strait.

Vladyslav Balinskyi, editor-in-chief, «Zeleniy Lyst» · 8 August 2026

On 30 July 2026 Ukraine’s Defence Forces struck a transport-and-fuel node near the port of Taman that supplies fuel to the Russian grouping in the south. Despite the official Russian account of a “grain terminal” and the civilian label on the map, the satellite evidence points to burning petroleum products.

On the face of it the episode is clear: an enemy supply base destroyed. But once the parties’ statements are set against what the satellites actually show, the picture splits into three competing accounts of three different substances, and that discrepancy is where the real question lies. What burned on the shore of the Kerch Strait, and what the current is now carrying along the coast, we established not from statements but from instruments: backward drift modelling on Sentinel-1 and Sentinel-2 data, the thermal record from NASA FIRMS, and the actual wind regime from the strait’s weather stations.

Grain, oil or petroleum: concealing a military target

Once the scale of losses at the logistics hub became clear, the Russian side began contradicting itself. The transport prosecutor’s office reported damage to the port; an industry outlet insisted the affected facilities were “unrelated to petroleum transhipment”; and claims soon surfaced of a strike on a major grain terminal. Yet directly above the fire’s epicentre the satellite map carries an entirely civilian label: “oilseed processing plant.” Three accounts, three substances, and at least one of them is untrue.

Sentinel-2: intact Tamanneftegaz tank farm and black smoke above the facility labelled as an oilseed processing plant
Photo 4. Sentinel-2, 31 July 2026. The Tamanneftegaz tank farm is intact, while a black smoke column rises over the facility labelled as an oilseed processing plant. Source: Sentinel Hub / OpenStreetMap.

The grain framing is not accidental: it lets Russia invoke global food security and court international outrage. In this case, however, the substance is fuel, and that can be shown step by step.

Smoke does not lie: fuel that burned without pause

The Sentinel-2 optical image shows a dense, uniformly black, oily smoke column carried out to sea, with a visible plume length of roughly 100 kilometres on the 31 July frame by our own measurement. From there it is a matter of elimination. Vegetable oil does not ignite from a strike: its flash point exceeds 300 °C, and the smoke would in any case be pale. Hexane, the solvent used in oil extraction, flares black but burns off in minutes, whereas this fire ran for days. Biomass such as husk and meal burns unevenly, with a pale margin, not as an even black column. Once all three are ruled out, what remains is a steady, black, multi-day fire, and that is the signature of a stable hydrocarbon.

Sentinel-2: fire epicentre at Taman port with a dense black smoke plume
Photo 1. Sentinel-2 L1C, 31 July 2026. The fire epicentre. Uniform black smoke is the signature of burning petroleum products. Source: Sentinel Hub.
Sentinel-2 wide view of the black smoke plume extending from Taman port over the sea
Sentinel-2 regional view of smoke transport across the Kerch Strait area
Sentinel-2 with a roughly 111 km² pollution bounding polygon and a roughly 100 km smoke plume measurement
Photos 2, 3, 5. Sentinel-2, 31 July 2026. Wide and regional views of the smoke; a polygon gives the bounding area of the early contamination (about 111 km²), and a ruler gives the plume length (about 100 km). Source: Sentinel Hub.

Oil does not burn: verified across eight cases

There is empirical support as well. «Zeleniy Lyst» has systematically documented strikes on oil infrastructure, and over two years there have been at least eight hits on vegetable-oil tanks in the ports of Pivdennyi and Chornomorsk. In none of them did the oil sustain a lasting black flame: it leaked, spread as a film, occasionally set nearby structures alight, but never produced an oily black column lasting days. We compiled the comparison in our satellite analysis of Operation Molochka.

Thermal signal: a fire that did not go out

FIRMS records heat independently of smoke, and the picture from 28 July to 4 August is unambiguous. On 28 July it is clear, the pre-strike baseline. On the 29th isolated background detections appear, and on the 30th a dense cluster flares on the day of the strike. From 31 July through 2 August the signal holds at full strength; on 3 August the periphery burns down but the hotspot at the facility itself does not disappear, and on the 4th fresh detections appear around it. The essential point is that the plant’s own location burned without interruption throughout.

NASA FIRMS, 28 July 2026: pre-strike baseline
NASA FIRMS, 29 July 2026: isolated background thermal detections
NASA FIRMS, 30 July 2026: dense thermal anomaly cluster on the day of the strike
NASA FIRMS, 31 July 2026: strong thermal signal after the strike
NASA FIRMS, 1 August 2026: persistent thermal signal at the site
NASA FIRMS, 2 August 2026: continued persistent thermal signal
NASA FIRMS, 3 August 2026: site hotspot remaining after the periphery weakened
NASA FIRMS, 4 August 2026: new thermal detections around the hotspot
Photos 6–13. NASA FIRMS, 28 July — 4 August 2026. A continuous fire at the site: the hotspot is recorded every day, only the coverage area changes. The scatter of coordinates falls within FIRMS resolution (pixel about 375 m). Source: NASA FIRMS.

Vegetable oil does not burn for six days. Hexane burns off in minutes. Meal does not radiate heat like this. This is fuel, and it kept burning.

A civilian label on a military node

When a site is listed on every map as an oilseed processing plant, yet its hotspot burns without pause for six days and throws a hundred-kilometre black plume, this is no longer coincidence but tactic. Military logistics are hidden behind a civilian label so that a strike can be recast as a hit on “civilian infrastructure” or “on grain.” Two readings are possible and both point the same way: either the occupiers kept fuel under the guise of a civilian enterprise, using it as a shield, or it genuinely was an oil mill into which petroleum was piped for army needs. Either way this is the deliberate use of a civilian object for military purposes, itself a breach of international humanitarian law by the party that does it.

The cause should be named plainly. Russia is waging a war of destruction against Ukraine, and Ukraine, in defending itself, is entitled to strike the adversary’s military-logistics objects. The aggressor state has deliberately turned occupied Crimea and the Taman shore into a military-logistics complex, a fuel-supply node for the offensive, and placed it on the shore of a semi-enclosed sea, without secondary containment or visible safety measures, under civilian labels. Such a node carries a dual threat, military because it feeds the front and environmental because any damage to it sends product straight into the water, and responsibility for the environmental consequences rests with the side that built it this way and in this place.

Contamination on the water: spill dynamics

While Russian media spoke of grain and oil, the satellites were recording the actual slick, and doing so in two different ways. On the very first day the Sentinel-2 optical image of 31 July, captured under sun glint that reveals the film’s surface smoothing, allowed the early contamination to be outlined by polygon, yielding a bounding area of about 111 square kilometres. That figure must be read correctly: it is the area of the envelope, not a continuous film, because within it the product is scattered as separate fingers and streaks, and only a fraction of the water is actually covered. The slick was then tracked by Sentinel-1 radar, which detects the dampening of small waves even through cloud: on 1 August a compact plume 18.91 km long south of Taman, and on 4 August a tongue stretched to 40.44 km with vortex structures at the current boundary. The transport rate is roughly 7–8 kilometres per day, and the source was not a one-off, since fresh FIRMS hotspots on 4 August show that inflows continued.

Sentinel-2 sun glint: 111.19 km² pollution bounding area and about 100.93 km smoke plume
Photo 5. Sentinel-2, 31 July 2026, sun glint. A polygon gives the bounding area of the early contamination, 111.19 km²; a ruler gives the plume length, about 100.93 km. Source: Sentinel Hub.
Sentinel-1, 1 August: compact 18.91 km pollution plume south of Taman
Sentinel-1, 4 August: pollution tongue stretched to 40.44 km with vortex structures
Photos 14, 15. Sentinel-1 IW, 1 and 4 August 2026. Drift of the film from 18.91 km to 40.44 km over three days to the south-west. Source: Sentinel Hub.

Movement forecast: from Anapa to the Kerch peninsula

From 30 July to 2 August a north-easterly wind of 5–14 metres per second drove the film south-west, towards the coast of Anapa, and on 4 August it swung southerly and eased to 2–4 metres, so the outflow to open sea stopped and the contamination began to be drawn back towards the mouth of the strait. For the shorelines this means that at Anapa the risk persists on the shallows while new inflows cease, whereas the main threat shifts to the western shore of the Kerch peninsula, towards Kerch and on to Feodosia, where a weak southerly wind will draw the film. The exact heading beyond two or three days is hard to predict, because under a weak synoptic background the sea-breeze cycle takes over, onshore by day and offshore by night.

Update 5–8 August: the forecast held, and oil surfaced on the water

A few days after first publication new Sentinel-2 frames became available, confirming two of our conclusions and substantially strengthening a third. The drift forecast held: we wrote that once the wind reversed the contamination would be drawn along the western shore of the peninsula towards Feodosia, and that is what happened. On the 5 August image the slick is recorded along the southern shore, near the Opuk reserve and the Feodosia gulf, and on the 8 August frame the total transport length from Taman reaches 75.93 kilometres, against 40 four days earlier. The slick did not dissipate; it stretched along the coast exactly along the predicted scenario.

Sentinel-2, 5 August: contamination along the southern Kerch Peninsula near Opuk and Feodosia
Sentinel-2, 8 August: pollution transport extending 75.93 km from Taman
Photo 16. Sentinel-2, 5 August 2026. Contamination along the southern shore of the Kerch peninsula (Opuk, Feodosia). Photo 17. Sentinel-2, 8 August 2026. Transport length from Taman, 75.93 km. Source: Sentinel Hub.

The decisive point, however, is the nature of the light-coloured contamination. Along the shore a dense, form-holding yellowish structure is visible, not a thin iridescent sheen but thick emulsified ridges, and that is a diagnostic feature. Light petroleum products have low viscosity, spread into a thin film within minutes and give a silvery-iridescent sheen, but do not form dense ridges, having nothing to hold structure with. Fuel oil and crude, by contrast, are dark, because a thick layer absorbs light. Vegetable oil is viscous and emulsifies under wave action, forming a dense light phase resembling yellow sour cream, so a dense yellow ridge matches neither light petroleum products nor fuel oil and points to a viscous, emulsifiable substance, most probably vegetable oil.

We have seen this same signature before. After the strike on Chornomorsk on 26 April 2026, where a confirmed sunflower-oil spill occurred, the water developed the same dense yellow emulsified structures, and the morphology matches.

Sentinel-2, 26 April 2026: dense yellow emulsified structures from the confirmed vegetable-oil spill near Sukhyi Lyman in Chornomorsk
Reference: Sentinel-2, 26 April 2026, Chornomorsk. Dense yellow emulsified structures of a confirmed oil spill near the shore (Sukhyi Lyman). Source: Sentinel Hub.

This is a morphological comparison of optical frames, not a spectral proof of substance identity, so “the same emulsified morphology, characteristic of vegetable oil” is a conclusion grounded in remote-sensing evidence rather than a substitute for laboratory confirmation.

What this means for the whole story is that the two accounts, the Russian one of oil and grain and the Ukrainian one of petroleum, stop being mutually exclusive, because the data show both, but separately, each by its own signature. Fuel burned, as the FIRMS heat and the black smoke attest, and alongside it, at a mixed terminal, there was oil that leaked on impact, did not burn as in the eight documented cases, and days later surfaced as light ridges along the coast. Not “either/or,” but “fuel burned and oil spilled,” with each component proven by its own independent signature.

What comes next. On the imagery the yellow emulsified ridge is effectively already within the Feodosia gulf, and the Feodosia shore is not far from there. The wind is carrying it precisely that way, so in the coming days the oil should appear along the Feodosia coast and adjacent stretches of the southern Crimean shore. This is no longer a distant forecast but a matter of a few kilometres and a few days.

Consequences for the marine environment

The facility sits on the shore, right at the waterline, without secondary containment or visible engineering barriers, so any damage to the tanks sends product straight into the sea. This occurs in a sensitive body of water: the Black Sea is anoxic below 150–200 metres, living benthos exists only on a narrow strip of shelf, and additional loading presses it against the hydrogen-sulphide boundary. The area’s benthic filter feeders, mussels, polychaetes and small crustaceans, are also the forage base for commercial fish, so damage to the bottom propagates through the whole food chain.

Petroleum products and vegetable oil act differently, and this matters for assessing the consequences. Petroleum products carry carcinogenic toxicity through polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons; part evaporates, the rest settles. Vegetable oil has no carcinogenic properties but behaves more insidiously: in summer, under ultraviolet light and in warm water, it polymerises, hardening into a dense benthic cap almost impermeable to oxygen. According to NOAA, such polymerised oil persists on the bottom for more than six years; without polymerisation it would biodegrade within half a year, but the Taman strike occurred at the height of summer, in conditions that guarantee polymerisation. Storm-driven resuspension returns the sediment to the water column season after season. For birds the oil is more dangerous than fuel oil, because it disrupts feather microstructure so that washing cannot restore it, and by our field observations after the December 2025 spill no more than five percent of the birds counted as rescued actually returned to the wild. A detailed treatment of these mechanisms, with references to the scientific literature and field data, is given in our report on the third oil spill in Odesa Bay.

The consequences are not local. Currents carry the contamination along the coast into the open Black Sea, where the cyclonic circulation spreads it over hundreds of kilometres, or northward through the strait into the shallow, spawning-ground Sea of Azov. Fuel oil from the Volgoneft wrecks in this same waters was recorded in the Tuzly Lagoons near Odesa, over 650 kilometres away, and every new accident is layered on the previous ones while the sea cannot process the load. Our field confirmations are compiled in the Tuzly Lagoons research and on the Environmental Evidence Platform.

In lieu of conclusions: what is established, what remains open

Established by direct observation and instruments: a continuous multi-day fire at the site from 30 July to 4 August (FIRMS); early film contamination of about 111 km² and a smoke plume of about 100 km (Sentinel-2); drift of the film from 19 to 40 km (Sentinel-1) and on to 76 km as of 8 August; that fuel burned rather than agricultural produce, along three independent lines; that the light contamination shows an emulsified morphology characteristic of vegetable oil, matching the reference spill at Chornomorsk; and that the drift forecast along the Kerch peninsula held.

What remains hypothesis is the specific fuel type and the reason for its presence at a civilian-labelled site, the exact area of continuous film since the satellite gives only the envelope, the trajectory beyond two or three days since current data are required, and the full extent of harm to biocenoses without field verification, because there is no access to the occupied shore.

Sources and data

  1. Sentinel-1, Sentinel-2 — ESA / Copernicus (Sentinel Hub).
  2. NASA FIRMS — thermal anomalies, 28 July — 8 August 2026.
  3. Surface weather observations, Opasne station; ECMWF forecast.
  4. Persistence of vegetable oil on the seabed — NOAA, Non-Petroleum Oil Spills.
  5. Methodology: DOI 10.20535/EHS2710-3315.2025.332100.
  6. Statements by the parties are given per official communications and require verification against primary sources.

Author: Vladyslav Balinskyi, editor-in-chief, «Zeleniy Lyst». Satellite data: ESA/Copernicus. Thermal data: NASA FIRMS. This is an analytical material; factual claims are kept separate from hypotheses.

ByVladislav Balinsky

Sinking of Golden Leo: Environmental Risks in the Black Sea

Environmental monitoring · Odesa Bay · July 2026

The loss of Golden Leo is not an isolated maritime casualty. It adds another layer of pressure to waters already affected by the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, heavy-fuel-oil pollution and wartime attacks. Fuel, bilge water, a cargo of corn and an unstable hull may act at the same time—at the surface, near the seabed and within marine sediments.


Golden Leo trailing smoke after a Russian missile strike in the Black Sea on 19 July 2026
Golden Leo after a Russian missile strike in the Black Sea on 19 July 2026. Photo: Vladyslav Balinskyy.

War is changing the Black Sea not only through explosions, but through processes whose effects may persist for years. The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, heavy-fuel-oil pollution following the casualty involving Russian tankers in the Kerch Strait, sunken vessels and attacks on civilian shipping are creating an interconnected system of risk.

Golden Leo adds another potential source of pressure roughly five nautical miles off Odesa, in shallow coastal waters strongly influenced by wind-driven circulation.

For Odesa Bay, the sinking of Golden Leo is not only a human tragedy but a new source of long-term environmental risk. A large wreck containing fuel, technical fluids and a cargo of corn may affect surface waters, bottom waters, seabed sediments and the safety of navigation.

What happened

On 19 July, the Guinea-Bissau-flagged merchant vessel Golden Leo, carrying Ukrainian corn, came under a Russian missile attack while leaving the port of Chornomorsk through Ukraine’s maritime corridor. Ten people were killed—nine crew members and a Ukrainian maritime pilot. After several days of damage-control efforts, the vessel was no longer seaworthy and sank on 26 July, approximately five nautical miles off the Odesa coast.


Golden Leo almost completely submerged off the Odesa coast on 26 July 2026
Golden Leo sinking off the Odesa coast on 26 July 2026. Photo: Odesa Regional Military Administration.

Among the many Odesa residents who witnessed the disaster was Vladyslav Balinskyy, a researcher at Tuzly Lagoons National Nature Park and head of the Odesa branch of the National Ecological Centre of Ukraine.

“The ship was struck in three successive missile attacks. After the first hit, the Russians waited roughly seven or eight minutes—the very period when pilot boats, emergency responders and other support craft would normally approach a damaged vessel. A second strike followed, and then a third,” Balinskyy says.

Three successive strikes on a civilian vessel turned an immediate human tragedy into a long-term engineering and environmental problem.

Golden Leo and a smoke plume over the sea after successive Russian missile strikes on 19 July 2026
Golden Leo after the attack. Photo: Vladyslav Balinskyy.

The damaged and smoking superstructure of Golden Leo after the Russian missile strike on 19 July 2026
Damage to Golden Leo after the Russian strike on 19 July 2026. Photo: Ukrainian Navy.

Attacks on civilian shipping have become systematic

Since spring 2026, Russia has sharply intensified attacks on civilian shipping in the Black Sea. According to Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister for Restoration, Oleksii Kuleba, more than 70 attacks on merchant vessels had been recorded since the beginning of the year.

According to the Odesa Regional Prosecutor’s Office, 28 civilian vessels were hit in the ports of Greater Odesa in just one month, from the second half of June to the second half of July. Twenty-six were foreign-flagged and two were Ukrainian. The attacks killed 21 people and injured another 34.

Among the first documented incidents of 2026 was a strike on 18 May against a Marshall Islands-flagged merchant vessel owned by a Chinese shipowner. On 29 May, the Vanuatu-flagged bulk carrier ANT was hit while leaving a port in Odesa region for Türkiye. A fire broke out on board and two crew members were injured.

On 22 June, Russia carried out another attack on civilian vessels in the Black Sea. At least three merchant ships flying the flags of Panama, Vanuatu and China were struck. A cook from Egypt was killed on one vessel, while eight other seafarers had to abandon ship in a life raft.

The pace of attacks rose sharply in July. Within a single week, vessels flying the flags of Saint Kitts and Nevis, Togo, Tanzania, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Antigua and Barbuda, Palau and other states were reported hit. Some vessels were attacked more than once.

The 19 July strike on Golden Leo became the culmination of that escalation.

Several days earlier, on 13 July, the International Maritime Organization formally condemned a series of attacks on civilian merchant vessels in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov and called for attacks on international shipping to stop.

On 23 July, Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy reported that the sharp rise in Russian attacks had prompted shipowners to temporarily suspend calls at Ukrainian Black Sea ports.

On 27 July, the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting on the safety of civilian shipping in the Black Sea. According to the UN, more than 40 crew members were killed or injured in attacks on civilian vessels during July alone.

The rising threat has already disrupted maritime logistics. Lloyd’s List Intelligence described operating conditions as the worst since the Black Sea Grain Initiative ended in 2023. Insurance premiums and freight rates increased, while some international operators, including Maersk, temporarily suspended selected Ukrainian services because of the security situation.

Two very different approaches to warfare at sea

Balinskyy argues that the Golden Leo case exposes a fundamental distinction between military operations designed to disrupt an opponent’s logistics and attacks directed at civilian shipping.

Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces conducted Operation Molochka from 6 to 28 July with the aim of cutting fuel-supply routes serving Russia’s southern military grouping.

Russia used occupied Crimea as a transport and logistics hub. Across the Sea of Azov, small tankers and cargo vessels of the Volgoneft, Volgobalt and related designs regularly moved substantial quantities of fuel and lubricants. The existence of that transport system in itself posed a potential threat to the ecosystems of the wider Black Sea–Azov basin.

A detailed satellite-based assessment is available in the Green Leaf investigation “201 Vessels Hit—but Not 201 Fires: Satellite Analysis of Operation Molochka”.

Reflecting on the environmental consequences of Operation Molochka, Balinskyy says:

“Ukraine’s objective was to shut down this logistics network, but to do so as precisely as possible. During the period we analysed, from 6 to 27 July, we found no evidence of widespread ship fires or large-scale releases of petroleum products into the sea. Although 129 vessels operated in the segment we examined, and more than two hundred were active across the wider Black Sea–Azov basin, we observed only two comparatively long-lasting fires and several local fuel leaks. At the same time, the logistics system itself effectively ceased to function.”

In his view, the attack on Golden Leo followed a fundamentally different logic.

Balinskyy’s assessment is that the objective was not simply to disable the vessel, but to maximise loss of life, destroy a civilian ship and create long-term risks for maritime transport and the marine environment.

“The warhead of a cruise missile is incomparably more powerful than that of an attack drone and may contain around 300 kilograms of explosive. The attack killed ten people, critically damaged the vessel and ultimately caused it to sink. Beyond the human tragedy, it created potential environmental risks that now require long-term monitoring and scientific assessment,” Balinskyy says.

After the vessel went down, the Odesa Regional Military Administration convened an emergency meeting of its commission on technological and environmental safety.

The commission introduced continuous monitoring of the Black Sea area to assess potential effects on the environment and on navigation safety.

Authorities are paying particular attention to possible leaks of fuel and lubricants into the sea.

But is surface surveillance alone enough to evaluate all the environmental consequences of a large merchant ship lying on the seabed?

Potential sources of pollution

In this context, the sinking of Golden Leo presents serious environmental risks for the north-western Black Sea and Odesa Bay. The effects are likely to remain local, but local does not mean insignificant. Odesa Bay is shallow and partly enclosed, and its water circulation depends heavily on wind direction and strength. Under certain weather and sea conditions, pollutants from the wreck site could be carried towards the coast.

The main potential sources of contamination are fuel, lubricants, hydraulic fluids, other technical substances and bilge water. Large bulk carriers have complex networks of fuel tanks, pipelines and machinery spaces that may retain considerable quantities of petroleum products after a casualty. Preliminary estimates suggest that a vessel of this class might have carried anything from several dozen tonnes to roughly 100–150 tonnes of heavy marine fuel. The actual amount can be established only from the ship’s documentation.

Bilge water poses a separate hazard. It is a mixture of water, fuel, lubricants and other technical fluids that accumulates in machinery spaces. If released, it can become another source of toxic contamination.

Surface waters

Fuel, lubricants and technical fluids may form films or slicks whose movement will depend largely on wind, waves and surface currents.

Bottom waters

Decomposition of the organic cargo may consume dissolved oxygen, alter local water chemistry and create oxygen-depleted conditions near the seabed.

Seabed sediments

Petroleum products and decomposition residues may accumulate in sediments and later be released during storms or if the wreck shifts.

The wreck itself

Instability, corrosion and storm loading may open new leakage pathways even when no visible contamination is present at the surface.

“Each individual object may have only a local effect, but the combined impact of many such sources is complex, cumulative and largely unpredictable,” Vladyslav Balinskyy says.

How a cargo of corn can affect the marine ecosystem

The ship’s cargo also requires attention. Corn is a natural material, but a large mass of organic matter concentrated in one place can still alter the marine environment. Some grain has reportedly been found on the shore of Odesa Bay, while most of the cargo is thought to remain inside the holds.

When large quantities of grain remain submerged, they can swell, ferment and gradually decompose. These processes consume dissolved oxygen, potentially creating local oxygen-depleted zones and changing conditions near the seabed. Anaerobic decomposition may also generate gases and organic compounds that affect benthic ecosystems.

At least two different impact pathways may therefore operate at the same time: surface contamination from possible fuel and lubricant leaks, and near-bottom changes caused by the decomposition of organic cargo. Their development will depend on weather, currents and local circulation.

Why an underwater survey is essential

Balinskyy says the immediate priority should be a detailed underwater survey of the wreck. Investigators need to determine how the hull is resting on the seabed, whether it is stable, whether autumn and winter storms could shift or break it apart, and what condition the fuel tanks, pipelines, access hatches and damaged sections are in.

Only then will it be possible to decide whether the hull needs to be sealed, whether fuel and bilge water should be pumped out, whether the wreck requires additional stabilisation, or whether other engineering measures are necessary. The site also needs clear navigational marking and long-term structural monitoring.

The feasibility of removing the corn requires a separate technical assessment. That decision depends on the vessel’s position, the condition of the holds, the extent of structural damage and whether the cargo can be reached safely.

Immediate questions that need answers

  • How the hull is positioned and whether it is stable at a depth of about 20 metres;
  • The condition of fuel tanks, pipelines, access hatches and breaches;
  • Whether the wreck can be sealed and fuel or bilge water pumped out;
  • The condition of the holds, the distribution of the corn and whether the cargo can be reached safely;
  • Whether the hull needs stabilisation, navigational marking and long-term structural monitoring.

War is creating a new human-driven regime in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov

Golden Leo is only one example of the environmental consequences of Russia’s full-scale war at sea.

Since the full-scale invasion began, the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov have become active theatres of war. Missile strikes on port infrastructure, attacks on civilian shipping, mined sea routes, sunken vessels, fuel leaks, destroyed hydraulic structures and the constant presence of military hardware are creating new forms of pressure on marine ecosystems.

Among the largest environmental shocks of recent years are the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam, which sent enormous volumes of organic matter, pollutants and sediments from the Dnipro basin into the Black Sea; the casualty involving Russian tankers in the Kerch Strait, which caused extensive heavy-fuel-oil pollution; and repeated attacks on civilian vessels using Ukraine’s maritime corridor.

Balinskyy argues that these events cannot be assessed in isolation.

“Existing damage is now being compounded by newly sunken vessels and by fragments of missiles and drones entering the marine environment. All of these objects may release petroleum products, metals, polymers and other pollutants. We are not dealing with separate incidents, but with accumulating pressures that must be studied as one system.”

In his assessment, the full-scale war has created an entirely new human-driven operating regime in the Black Sea. Before 2022, the main pressures were river runoff, shipping, agriculture, industrial pollution, eutrophication and climate change. They have now been joined by sunken vessels, missile and drone debris, munitions, damaged hydraulic infrastructure, fuel leaks and the large-scale movement of contaminated sediments.

Each pressure may appear local when considered alone. But currents, waves, storms and sediment transport connect them into a single system in which the effects of different events accumulate, interact and may emerge months or even years later.

“That is why responding to individual pollution incidents is no longer enough. We need to understand how the Black Sea ecosystem is changing as a whole and how different sources of pressure interact,” Balinskyy says.

The same cumulative pattern is visible in field research along the coast of Tuzly Lagoons National Nature Park, where scientists are documenting heavy fuel oil, fragments of Russian aerial systems and the deaths of marine mammals at the same time.

From isolated incidents to systematic monitoring

Golden Leo again shows that dealing with the immediate aftermath of an accident is not enough. Environmental damage must also be documented systematically—for scientific assessment, future damage calculations, international investigations and the restoration of marine ecosystems.

To support that work, the non-governmental organisation Green Leaf, together with scientists from Tuzly Lagoons National Nature Park, developed the Black Sea Environmental Evidence Platform. It brings together Sentinel satellite data, field observations, laboratory analysis and photographic records. Each entry preserves coordinates, observation dates, sources, verification methods and scientific caveats.


The Black Sea Environmental Evidence Platform combining mapped incidents, satellite data and field verification
The Black Sea Environmental Evidence Platform brings together satellite data, field verification, media evidence and scientific interpretation.

The Platform does not determine legal responsibility. Its purpose is to preserve verifiable evidence that may support environmental assessments, damage evaluation and international legal proceedings.

The system has already been tested while documenting the Volgoneft tanker casualty and vegetable-oil spills in the ports of Pivdennyi and Chornomorsk. It can also be used to record the consequences of the sinking of Golden Leo, attacks on civilian vessels, marine pollution and other wartime incidents.

Balinskyy believes that Black Sea monitoring should become a continuous observation system combining satellite surveillance, field research, analysis of water and sediments, and structural monitoring of wrecks and other technological hazards.

Unlike water samples, which capture conditions only at the moment they are collected, sediments accumulate petroleum products, heavy metals, microplastics, organic pollutants and other substances over long periods. Storms, dredging and other natural or human-driven processes can release those contaminants back into the water, turning the seabed into a secondary source of pollution.

Monitoring around Golden Leo should therefore extend far beyond looking for visible oil slicks. It should include bottom-water and sediment sampling, measurements of petroleum hydrocarbons, organic matter and dissolved oxygen, and repeated observations around the wreck over an extended period.

Only this kind of integrated approach can assess more than the consequences of a single casualty. It can also help explain how war is gradually changing marine ecosystem function and creating new long-term risks across the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.

Monitoring Golden Leo must not end with a search for an oil slick. It should track the hull, surface and bottom waters, dissolved oxygen, organic matter, petroleum products and seabed sediments across seasons and storm cycles.

Sources and related reading

  1. National Ecological Centre of Ukraine — the original Ukrainian publication by Tetyana Herasymova on which this adapted edition is based.
  2. National Ecological Centre of Ukraine — background on the long-term effects of the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam on the Black Sea.
  3. National Ecological Centre of Ukraine — background on heavy-fuel-oil pollution following the casualty involving Russian tankers in the Kerch Strait.
  4. USM — reporting on the attack against Golden Leo and the circumstances of the incident.
  5. Reuters — reporting on the vessel’s loss on 26 July 2026.
  6. Ministry for Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine — the reported number of attacks on merchant vessels since the beginning of 2026.
  7. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Ukrainian Service — figures from the Odesa Regional Prosecutor’s Office on vessels hit, fatalities and injuries.
  8. International Maritime Organization — statement on attacks against civilian shipping in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.
  9. Latifundist — reporting on the temporary suspension of vessel calls at Ukrainian ports.
  10. USM — reporting on the emergency UN Security Council meeting on attacks against shipping.

Related articles from Green Leaf

Editorial note. This is an English editorial adaptation of the Ukrainian article published by the National Ecological Centre of Ukraine. The title, introductory framing, structure, visual presentation and links to the Green Leaf series were adapted for an English-language audience; the author’s reporting and the expert assessments were preserved.